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Being In Uncertainties, Mysteries, Doubt1
(Commentary on Marks-Tarlow’s “A Fractal Epistemology for Transpersonal Psychology”)

William J. Coburn2

Institute of Contemporary Psychoanalysis,
Los Angeles, CA, USA
A unification bridging and superseding the Newtonian-Galilean worldview on the one side and the
romantic worldview on the other, bringing together mind and matter, the human sciences and the
natural sciences, is to be found in an inclusive phenomenology—one that recognizes the physical world
as but a domain of experience (instead of the absolute and exclusive foundation of the Real).
—George Atwood [George Atwood’s Deep Thoughts Journal (online), 2017, p. 5]

I

was once, or, I should say, many times, out of
my body. This was when, decades ago, sensory
deprivation tanks were de rigueur on Wilshire
Boulevard in Los Angeles. I can reliably say I had
transcendental experiences, some of which were
“out of body,” but then once the black, warm
saltwater catapulted me into a panic attack, that was
it for me. Never again. I often wonder what additional
frontiers, new landscapes, I could have explored had
I not panicked. So much for the rational part of my
brain. I cannot deny I have had other edge-of-myseat experiences subsequently; perhaps I could call
them transcendental, but never in the confines of a
coffin-like tank. How can I account for them? And
why the panic?
Unlike many other paradigms in the broader
field of psychology, transpersonal psychology,
and therapy, has never been squeamish about the
anomaly, the novel, the unexpected. An exceptional
contribution, Marks-Tarlow’s article (2020, this issue;
subsequent citations refer to this article) is a welcome
and expansive deepening of our understanding and
exploration of our intensely idiosyncratic experiential
worlds, through fresh eyes and a unique perspective.
Transpersonal psychology’s emphasis on the
whole person, on not pathologizing, on not reducing
what is human to categorical caricatures, deeply
resonates not only with my own contemporary
clinical and philosophical sensibilities, but also with
a variety of burgeoning contextualist psychoanalytic
perspectives beginning in the 1970’s (e.g., Atwood
& Stolorow, 1979). To my mind, Marks-Tarlow
substantially extends these sensibilities in her
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engaging exploration of fractal geometry. She
addresses the transpersonal divide—essentially
between an unremitting emphasis on emotional
phenomenology, on the one hand, and the need
for objective verification and explanation of such
phenomena, empirically and objectivist based,
on the other hand. This debate can be witnessed
today in psychoanalysis wherein arguments
about phenomenological contextualism versus
neuroscientific study of the brain continue to
unfold. And happily, there are integrationists, such
as Seligman (2005), who aim to incorporate a
complexity sensibility into both sides of the debate.
Marks-Tarlow highlights the Friedman-Ferrer
argument: Friedman’s claim to objectivity, posits
Ferrer, is “guilty of its own charge” (p. xx). Every
perspective, is, well, just that, a perspective—one
of many. There is no view from nowhere (Nagel,
1986). Marks-Tarlow aims to heal this divide, “an
ever-widening schism between these two positions”
(p. xx). She proposes the mathematics of fractal
geometry as “model, method, and metaphor for
otherwise ambiguous and inaccessible transpersonal
phenomena” (p. xx).
Why do we need corroborative evidence to
substantiate our transpersonal experiences? Why are
we intrigued by an FMRI that affords us a peek at our
neuronal infrastructure? Is that where the action is?
Is it our human propensity to want to validate and
concretize our lived, subjective experience, born of
our unique organizing principles and interpretative
activity, that gives rise to what we consider to be true
and real? Perhaps. Perhaps we need to feel that what
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we experience is indeed true and real. Descartes
was a glaring example of our human proclivity for
fundamental doubt, search for clarity, and “irritable
grasping after fact and reason” (Keats, 1817/1899, p.
277), while eventually also the epitome of having to
arrive at conclusions that felt rational and reliable.
Was my own panic simple claustrophobia, or was it
perhaps an emergent property and product of having
my heretofore “true and real” world confronted,
opposed, and turned on its head?
If we are to apply a more scientifically rigorous
model to transpersonal phenomena, personally I
cannot think of a more conducive and persuasive
methodology than fractal geometry, as beautifully
outlined by Marks-Tarlow. Fractal geometry is
uniquely suited for mapping and understanding
seemingly messy natural phenomena—the noise
in the universe, reiterated throughout innumerable
mass, space, and time scales, that philosophers and
scientists traditionally tended to ignore or dismiss
as irrelevant anomalies. Generally our universe had
been neat, tidy, and rational. While Newton and
others may have stood on the shoulders of giants,
their view was not far-reaching enough to anticipate
the radical complexity of our lives and of our world
in which we are relentlessly embedded. Complexity
theorists from a variety of disciplines such as Poincare
and Guillaume (1900), Lorenz (1963), Bertalanffy
(1968), Laszlo (1972), Kauffman (1995), Bak (1996),
and Cilliers (1998), just to name a few, fortuitously
introduced to us a multi-faceted, groundbreaking
paradigm with which we can grasp an exponentially
richer and more complex view of how our world
works. And this sensibility has advantageously
infiltrated the fields of psychology and psychoanalysis
(Thelen & Smith, 1994, 2005; Stolorow, 1997; Piers,
2000; Marks-Tarlow, 2011; Seligman, 2005; Coburn,
2014; and many others), offering us a deeper glance
into and respect for the complexity of human
experiencing and meaning-making—I believe, one
of the hallmarks of the endeavor of transpersonal
psychology. Intertwined within a complex systems
framework is the fractal geometry with which MarksTarlow elegantly bridges the Friedman-Ferrer divide.
That said, coming from a complexity, contextualist, and phenomenologically based perspective in
contemporary psychoanalysis, my own bias resides

in eschewing any notions of objectivity insofar as
such objectivism presumes a clear and pristine view
of psychological or even natural phenomena. Each of
us is relentlessly situated, and each of our respective
situatednesses is as individually and uniquely
contoured as the fractals about which Marks-Tarlow
writes. Admittedly, many of us wish for an objective
world with objective facts, one we can rely upon,
one familiar to us, one we can awake to tomorrow
morning—hence our “irritable grasping after fact and
reason.” Adam Phillips (1999) once remarked: “Fear
of the unknown [and I would add, of transpersonal
experience] is cured through flight into the intelligible…
The familiar, the unsurprising, restores our collusive
sanity” (pp. 110–111). And in the clinical realm, as I
have written elsewhere, “there is nothing quite like the
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual if you are looking
for a convenient device to reduce the complexity
and contextuality of experiencing and meaningmaking down to two-dimensional caricatures of what
is human” (2014, p. 62). Flight into the intelligible
obscures our existential panic.
Marks-Tarlow ambitiously offers us a “novel
epistemology for transpersonal psychology” and,
I believe, thereby advances our field in directions
useful in not only narrowing the epistemological
divide, but also in privileging “what is unique,
irregular, and rare in nature, including [most notably]
human subjective experience” (p. xx). She tells us,
“transpersonal psychology is in need of a more
holistic scientific/mathematical fractal framework
that helps to embrace the full breadth and depth
of its psychological and experiential scope” (p. xx).
And I would argue further that fractal geometry in
particular, alongside our contextualist paradigms
that privilege non-reductionist, non-pathologizing,
non-objectivist perspectives, can only improve
and expand any domain that takes the slightest
interest in human experiencing and its attendant
meanings—the stranger and more unique, the better!
Strangeness, uniqueness, creativity, and novelty
are quintessentially human. And this sensibility is
especially vital in the consultation room.
Of her many reflections on fractals, MarksTarlow references the sticky problem of consciousness
and conscious awareness. And while she states that
she is not offering us a theory of consciousness per
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se, she does assert, vis-à-vis fractal geometry, that
the “structure of subjective experience” includes
“open boundaries between conscious awareness
and physical, natural levels of brain, body, and
surrounding environment” (p. xx). I concur: There can
be no consciousness without world, and no world
without consciousness. The two are relentlessly and
inextricably intertwined, and evolutionarily have
always been mutually constitutive. This is the radical
contextualism that drives my clinical work, including
my assumption that my patients’ experiences are not
epiphenomena and always emerge at the interface
of one’s history, one’s present, one’s imagined future,
one’s physical state, one’s relations with others, and
one’s world in general.
Marks-Tarlow speaks of the “subjective
feeling of fuzzy boundaries and infinite extension”
(p. xx), or, in general, “nondual awareness” (p. xx).
I believe this type of experience reflects circumstances in which, in my own vernacular, the realm
of the phenomenological happens to be coinciding
with the realm of the explanatory (which it does not
always do). That is to say, explanatorily speaking,
lived subjective experience is always understood
as a product and property of larger complex,
highly networked, relational systems, subject to
the characteristics of nonlinearity, unpredictability,
disequilibrium, and complexity (in the complexity
theory sense of the term). It is messy and
networked, and in that sense has no boundaries.
Phenomenologically speaking, however, we do
not necessarily experience ourselves that way, as
boundary-less, extended, and intensely networked.
Indeed, we may experience ourselves at times as
singular, unfettered, agentic, disconnected from the
world, even alienated, and quite alone with what
we think of as our personal individuality, our self.
These instances of our experiencing technically do
not match up, experientially, with the feel of the
underlying systems latticework in which we are
always embedded. Phenomenologically, anything
goes—all dimensions of experience are possible. And
sometimes, perhaps in more transcendental states of
mind, we can experience the fuzzy boundaries and
infinite extension of which Marks-Tarlow speaks,
in which case as I alluded to previously, we are
closer in experience to our originary matrices and
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their infinitely far-reaching networks compared to
the more singular, isolated-mind mode of living in
which we typically negotiate our daily lives. Familiar
experience is pregnant with infinite possibilities.
In addition to working at bridging epistemological gaps—an enormous undertaking—I especially
applaud Marks-Tarlow for her scientific and
mathematical rigor in addressing the unique, the
novel, and the complex in human nature and
human experiencing. Fractal geometry, a persuasive
framework for better appreciating the foundation of our
emotional lives and our experiences of nonduality, can
only enhance and extend our clinical work into realms
unknown to more linear, traditional, and evidencebased perspectives. Her fractal epistemology is
indeed a much-needed corrective to the philosophies
of objectivism, individualism, and traditionalism that
otherwise unfortunately continue to pervade our field.
Endnotes
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Quoted from John Keat’s (1817/1899) letter to his
brothers, George and Thomas.
William J. Coburn is Founding Editor Emeritus
of Psychoanalysis, Self and Context (formerly
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Psychology), Associate Editor of Psychoanalytic
Dialogues, and an Editorial Board Member of
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Editorial Board Member of Psychoanalytic Inquiry.
His most recent book is titled Psychoanalytic
Complexity: Clinical Attitudes for Therapeutic
Change (Routledge, 2014). Coburn’s commentary,
entitled “Being In Uncertainties, Mysteries,
Doubt” supports Marks-Tarlow’s unique efforts
to reconcile subjective, emotional elements with
objective explanation and verification, likening it to
contemporary psychoanalysis, wherein arguments
about phenomenological contextualism versus
neuroscientific study of the brain continue to unfold,
although Coburn’s personal bias is to eschew notions
of objectivity vis-a-vis the “relentlessly situated”
nature of personal experience.
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